Abstract Esteban (1986) introduced the notion of income share elasticity as a function ¼ which can describe the size distribution of income. On the other hand, indices of¯rst or second order stochastic dominance are widely used to describe shifts in income distribution, to which inequality measures are attached. The paper draws a link between the two, by providing conditions such that a given shift to ¼ is equivalent to a¯rst or second order stochastic dominance shift of the distribution of income. JEL Classi¯cation no: D31
Introduction
In his 1986 paper, Esteban suggests that for many applications the size distribution of income may be usefully described by the income share elasticity, as an alternative to the conventional density representation. This notion is put forward as a convenient way to impose stylized-fact restrictions to be tested against the empirical evidence, and to provide criteria for identifying di®erent classes of distributions.
On the other hand, in many economic applications the interesting feature to be studied is income dispersion, usually measured by indices of (¯rst or second order) stochastic dominance. In this note we draw a link between the two, by providing su±cient conditions on the shape of the income share elasticity which support (¯rst or second order) stochastic dominance { that is, such that a given shock to the income share elasticity has dispersion e®ects as measured by stochastic dominance.
The paper's main results are presented in the next section, while concluding remarks are gathered in section 3.
Income share elasticity and income dispersion
Income is distributed over some support (y m ; y M ), y M > y m¸0 , according to the density f(y; µ) > 0 for all y 2 (y m ; y M ), such that the distribution of income is de¯ned by F : (y m ; y M ) £ R ! [0; 1]. The real parameter µ measures a shift of the distribution which may be thought of as an index of dispersion, to be made more precise below. Letting subscripts denote derivatives, Esteban's income share elasticity is de¯ned as
and measures the relative marginal change in the share of income accruing to class y, brought about by a marginal increase in y. A one-to-one relationship exists between ¼ and the conventional density representation of the size distribution of income. Esteban (1986, p.443) identi¯es three restrictions which seem well supported by empirical evidence, and can be formalized using (1): (i ) the weak-weak Pareto Law, according to which ¼ approaches some constant value ¡® < 0 as y tends to in¯nity; (ii ) the existence of at least one mode, which implies that ¼(y; µ) = 1 has at least one solution over the support of the distribution; and (iii ) that ¼ exhibits a constant rate of decline, implying for all y that either ¼ y (y; µ) = 0, or the elasticity of ¼ y (y; µ) is a negative constant. A generalized three-parameter Gamma distribution satis¯es all of these.
1
As to stochastic dominance (SD), it is well known (e.g., Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992, ch.3) that a change in the parameter µ identi¯es a¯rst or second order SD shift of the distribution whenever the following conditions are satis¯ed for all y 2 (y m ; y M ):
for¯rst order SD; and
for second order SD; both inequalities hold strictly somewhere over the support of the distribution. It is a well known fact, widely used in economic applications, that the expected value of any increasing (increasing concave) function is increasing in µ whenever the latter measure¯rst (second) order SD.
The following proposition establishes su±cient conditions on ¼, for µ to be a¯rst-order SD parameter.
Proof. Let¸(y; µ) = f µ (y; µ)=f(y; µ), with f (y; µ) > 0 for all y 2 (y m ; y M ). It is easily seen that ¼ µ (y; µ) = y¸y(y; µ), so that ¼ µ (y; µ) > 0 for all y means that¸(y; µ) is monotonically increasing in y for any given µ. By de¯nition R y M ym¸( y; µ)f(y; µ)dy = F µ (y M ; µ) = 0, which, f(y; µ) being positive and the overall integral nil, implies that¸(y; µ) takes both negative and positive values. Since¸(y; µ) is increasing in y, the smallest (negative) value of y identi¯es the minimum of¸, occurring at y = y m and, by the same token,¸(y M ; µ) > 0 is a maximum for¸. Hence, there is a unique value b y of y such that¸(b y; µ) = 0. Consider now the function F µ (y; µ) = R y ym f µ (x; µ)dx, the¯rst derivative of which is f µ (y; µ) =¸(y; µ)f(y; µ). Since signff µ (y; µ)g = signf¸(y; µ)g, f µ (y; µ) vanishes at b y which is the unique minimum for F µ (y; µ). As¸(y; µ) is negative (positive) for y close to y m (y M ), so will be f µ (y; µ):
lies below the zero line: µ is then a¯rst order SD parameter.
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 concerns Esteban's¯nding (1986, p.444) that the family of distributions obeying all three restrictions mentioned above 2 are such that
with ® > 1, and¯; ² > 0: a decrease (increase) in ® (¯) is a¯rst order SD shock, and accordingly raises mean income. More generally,¯rst order stochastic dominance clearly implies (inverse) Lorenz dominance. This can also be seen using directly Proposition 1:
Proof. De¯ne b f i (y) = (1=¹ i )yf(y; µ i ) > 0, which can be treated as a density. It is easily seen that the corresponding Esteban elasticity b
for all y, which is equivalent to Lorenz dominance.
3
The Corollary may be convenient whenever elasticities are involved in assessing Lorenz dominance. For example, it is well known that the distribution of post-tax income Lorenz dominates that of pre-tax income if taxation is progressive (e.g., Lambert, 2001, p.190 ). This result follows immediately if we identify i = 1 with pre-tax and i = 2 with post-tax income: it is then readily seen that b
where R is residual progression (which of course is less than one by the de¯nition of progressive taxation). 4 We now take up second order SD. The following proposition establishes conditions on ¼ for µ to be a parameter of second order SD. 2 With the proviso that the mode m is unique and satis¯es m = ³2
1+®´1
=² . 3 An alternative proof, not involving¯rst order stochastic dominance, may be based on Lambert's Lemma 8.1 (2001, p.200), according to which if m(y) and n(y) are two attributes of an income distribution, the m-concentration curve dominates the n-concentration curve i® the y-elasticity of m (e m , say) lower than that of n (e n ). In our case, let the income distribution be f(y; µ 2 ), and de¯ne m(y) = 1 and n(y) = f (y; µ 1 )=f (y; µ 2 ) > 0: then e m = 0 and e n = ¼ 1 ¡ ¼ 2 , so that e m < e n is ¼ 1 > ¼ 2 . Proposition 2 Assume ¹ µ¸0 . Then, if ¼ µ (y; µ) is monotonically decreasing in y and crosses zero at some e y 2 (y m ; y M ), µ is a second order stochastic dominance parameter.
Proof. From Proposition 1, ¼ µ (y; µ) monotonically decreasing in y implies that y¸y(y; µ) is decreasing, i.e.¸y(y; µ) + y¸y y (y; µ) < 0. Since e y¸y(e y; µ) = 0 =¸y(e y; µ) and¸y(e y; µ) + e y¸y y (e y; µ) = e y¸y y (e y; µ) < 0 (all y being positive), e y is the unique interior maximum of¸(y; µ). By de¯nition R y M ym¸( y; µ)f (y; µ)dy = F µ (y M ; µ) = 0: hence,¸(y; µ) takes on both positive and negative values, which implies¸(e y; µ) > 0. As this is the unique turning point of¸, there are either one, or two interior values of y where¸(¢; µ) = 0.
(a) Suppose there is only one such value, y 0 say. Then note that y 0 < e y. To see this, assume to the contrary y 0 > e y, so that¸(y; µ) > 0 for y < y 0 , and¸(y; µ) < 0 for y > y 0 ; then F µ (y; µ) = R y ym f µ (x; µ)dx > 0 for all y: indeed, its¯rst derivative is f µ (y; µ) =¸(y; µ)f (y; µ) and f(y; µ) > 0 implies signff µ (y; µ)g = signf¸(y; µ)g: f µ (y; µ) vanishes at y 0 , which is the unique maximum for F µ (y; µ), with f µ (y; µ) positive (negative) for y lower (higher) than y 0 . Thus F µ (y; µ) points up (down) around y m (y M ) and, as F µ (y m ; µ) = F µ (y M ; µ) = 0, it lies above the zero line. But this contradicts the assumption ¹ µ¸0 , since it implies trivially ¹ µ < 0. Hence, indeed y 0 < e y, and so¸(y; µ) < 0 for y < y 0 , and¸(y; µ) > 0 for y > y 0 . Now we can apply the same reasoning, and take the function F µ (y; µ). Its derivative f µ (y; µ) obeys signff µ (y; µ)g = signf¸(y; µ)g and vanishes at y 0 , the unique minimum for F µ (y; µ). As¸(y; µ) is negative (positive) for y lower (higher) than y 0 , so will be f µ (y; µ): F µ (y; µ) points down (up) around y m (y M ). As F µ (y m ; µ) = F µ (y M ; µ) = 0, F µ (y; µ) lies below the zero line: µ is then a¯rst (and hence second) order SD parameter.
(b) Consider now the case where there exist two values of y, y 1 < y 2 say, such that¸(y 1 ; µ) =¸(y 2 ; µ) = 0. Then (i ) e y 2 (y 1 ; y 2 ); (ii )¸(y; µ) < 0 for y = 2 (y 1 ; y 2 ) and¸(y; µ) > 0 for y 2 (y 1 ; y 2 ). As signff µ (y; µ)g = signf¸(y; µ)g, the same goes for f µ (y; µ): thus F µ (y; µ) is decreasing around y m , and has a negative minimum in y 1 ; also, it is decreasing around y M , as F µ (y M ; µ) = 0 and y 2 identi¯es a positive maximum. This implies`single crossing', as there is only one value y ¤ 2 (y 1 ; y 2 ) such that F µ (y ¤ ; µ) = 0. De¯ne now S(y; µ) = R y ym F µ (x; µ)dx, so that obviously S y (y; µ) = F µ (y; µ). Since there is single crossing at y ¤ (where S y (y ¤ ; µ) = 0) and S yy (y ¤ ; µ) = f µ (y ¤ ; µ) > 0, y ¤ identi¯es the unique turning point, which is minimum. As S(y m ; µ) = 0 and ¹ µ¸0 implies S(y M ; µ) · 0, S(y; µ) always lies below the zero axis and µ is an index of second order SD. If ¹ µ = 0 = S(y M ; µ), it is a (inverse) mean preserving spread.
In analogy with Proposition 1, one implication of Proposition 2 is that it throws a bridge between the income share elasticity and Lorenz dominance. While obviously the discussion of Proposition 1 applies also to case (a) of the proof (which actually delivers¯rst order SD), case (b) is connected with Shorrocks' generalized Lorenz dominance: as is well known, if the function S(y; µ) used in the proof does not change sign, generalized Lorenz curves never intersect (e.g., Lambert, 2001 , p.55).
3 Concluding remarks
The notion of income share elasticity can have useful economic applications, for example when dealing with the relationship between income distribution and the price elasticity market demand (Benassi et al., 2002) . In this note we have outlined the relationship between (¯rst and second order) stochastic dominance, and the way income share elasticity depends on the distribution parameters; this also allows to see some related implications in terms of Lorenz dominance.
5 This can be directly seen by de¯ning the generalized Lorenz curve as L(p; µ) = R p 0 y(p; µ)dp, where y(p; µ) satis¯es F (y; µ) = p so that dp = f (y; µ)dy + F µ (y; µ)dµ. By implicit di®erentiation, y µ (p; µ) = ¡F µ (y(p; µ); µ)=f(y(p; µ); µ) so that L µ (p; µ) = R p 0 y µ (p; µ)dp = ¡ R p 0 F µ (y(p; µ); µ)=f (y(p; µ); µ)dp = ¡ R y ym F µ (y; µ)dy = ¡S(y; µ). As established above, the latter is positive in case (b) of the proof of Proposition 2.
